Machine learning models, especially Deep Neural Networks, are vulnerable to adversarial examples-malicious inputs crafted by adding small noises to real examples, but fool the models. Adversarial examples transfer from one model to another, enabling black-box attacks to real-world applications. In this paper, we propose a strong attack algorithm named momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) to discover adversarial examples. MI-FGSM is an extension of iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM) but improves the transferability significantly. Besides, we study how to attack an ensemble of models efficiently. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. We hope that MI-FGSM can serve as a benchmark attack algorithm for evaluating the robustness of various models and defense methods.
Introduction
It has long been shown that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, inputs crafted to make a model output attacker-desired but inaccurate predictions [1, 13, 8] . In particular, state-of-the-art Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are challenged by their vulnerability to adversarial attacks based on small, human-imperceptible modifications of the input [23, 4] , although DNNs offer tremendous benefits to various applications [11] , such as speech recognition [15, 21] , image classification [9, 22, 24, 5] , object detection [3, 20] , etc.
More severely, many works have demonstrated that adversarial examples have great transferability [23, 12, 16] , thus making black-box attacks practical in real-world applications and posing real security issues. That is, to attack a target black-box model (e.g., a real-world application) with unknown architecture and parameters, the attacker can simply build a mimic model locally and apply the adversarial examples found by the local model to attack the target model. The phenomenon of transferability is due to that different machine learning models learn similar decision boundaries around a datapoint, making the adversarial examples crafted for one model are also effective for others.
While adversarial examples cause critical issues in the development of machine learning techniques, extensive methods have been proposed to detect and defense adversarial attacks [14, 2, 17, 10, 27, 18] . In DNNs, although adversarial examples lead to incorrect classification, the intermediate features reveal significant differences between real and adversarial examples [2] , thus making detection of adversarial attacks feasible. For example, a simple Gaussian distribution of feature representation in convolutional layers can filter a great portion of adversarial examples [2] , and a detector network is efficient to detect such flaws [14] . Moreover, adversarial training proves to be an effective way to increase the robustness of DNNs [4, 10, 27] . By injecting adversarial examples into the training procedure, the models learn to resist adversarial perturbation in the gradient direction of the loss function.
In this paper, we propose a momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) to generate adversarial examples. Beyond iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM) that perturbs the input with sign of the gradients to maximize the loss function while meet the L ∞ bound, MI-FGSM accumulates a velocity vector in the gradient direction of the loss function across iterations, for the purpose of stabling update directions and escaping local maxima.
It is a well known fact that iterative methods [10] usually induce a higher success rate than one step methods like fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [4] when attacking a white-box model. On the other hand, the adversarial examples generated by iterative methods transfer at a lower rate [10, 27] , and thus make black-box attacks weak. However, we empirically show that generating adversarial examples by MI-FGSM, we can simultaneously obtain higher success rates in white-box and blackbox attacks. MI-FGSM eliminates the trade-off between white-box attacks and transferability, and acts as a stronger attack algorithm than simple FGSM and other iterative methods. Besides, we study several ensemble methods incorporating multiple models to increase the success rate of attacks [12] , and find that ensemble in logits performs better.
In summary, our work makes the following contributions:
• We introduce a new white-box attack algorithm called momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM), where we accumulate gradients of the loss function at each iteration to stable optimization and escape local maxima. MI-FGSM can increase the success rate in both white-box attacks and black-box attacks when increasing iterations. • We show that the proposed MI-FGSM attack algorithm outperforms FGSM and simple iterative methods significantly. We hope that MI-FGSM can act as a new benchmark attack algorithm to compare the robustness of different models. • We study several ensemble methods to generate adversarial examples for multiple models.
We show that ensemble in logits performs better than ensemble in prediction [12] and ensemble in loss. • We make our codes public to reproduce our experiments and serve as a benchmark at https://github.com/dongyp13/Non-Targeted-Adversarial-Attacks.
2 Notation and Related Work
Notation and Terminology
In this section, we specify and disambiguate the notation and terminology used in this paper:
• x-the real example from a given dataset. • x * -the adversarial example generated from x.
• y-one-hot encoding of the ground-truth label of x. We often use the predicted label as the ground-truth. • l(x)-the logits of a model given input x.
• p(x)-the predicted probability of a model given input x. Often p(x) = softmax(l(x)).
• J(x, y)-the loss function used to train the model, which is always a cross entropy loss defined as J(x, y) = −y · log(p(x)). • -the size of adversarial perturbation. We reqiure that the L ∞ norm between x and x * should not be greater than . • White-box attacks-the attacker knows everything about the models, including architectures, parameters, etc. • Black-box attacks-the attacker knows nothing about the models except the predictions. We measure transferability based on black-box attacks.
Attack Methods
We review three algorithms to generate adversarial examples. We introduce their untargeted version of attacks here, and the targered version can be simply derived.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] is an one step attack algorithm, which generates adversarial examples by adding sign of the gradients to maximize the loss function and can be written as:
where ∇ x J(x, y) is the gradient of the loss function w.r.t. the input space. FGSM is very simple and computationally efficient to find adversarial perturbations which meet the L ∞ bound.
Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) [10] iteratively applies FGSM multiple times with a small step size:
To make the generated adversarial examples satisfy L ∞ bound, one can clip x * t into the vicinity of x or simply set α = /T with T being the number of iterations. It has been shown that I-FGSM is a stronger white-box adversary at the cost of lower transfer rate [10, 27] .
Optimization-based methods [23] directly optimize the distance between the real and adversarial examples subject to the misclassification of adversarial examples. L-BFGS can be used to solve such a problem. A more sophisticated way is minimizing:
Gradient descent can be used to solve this problem but the distance measure d is often L 2 norm, making the L ∞ restriction hard to satisfy.
In this paper, we propose momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) to discover adversarial examples, which can fool white-box models as well as black-box models. Our method achieves much higher success rates in both white-box and black-box attacks than the aforementioned algorithms like FGSM and I-FGSM. We hope that MI-FGSM can serve as a new benchmark attack algorithm for evaluating the robustness of various models and defense methods. In Section 3, we first introduce how to attack an ensemble of models efficiently. Later in Section 4, we detail the MI-FGSM algorithm and show its effectiveness than other attack methods.
3 Attacking Ensemble of Models
Ensemble Methods
In this section, we study how to attack an ensemble of models efficiently. If an adversarial example remains adversarial for multiple models, it may capture an intrinsic direction that always fools these models and is more likely to transfer to other models at the same time [12] . We compare three ensemble methods, which are ensemble in logits, ensemble in prediction and ensemble in loss, and find that ensemble in logits performs better. Moreover, we explain why ensemble in logits works well in practice.
Ensemble in logits (Ens-Logits) means that we average the logits of multiple models:
where l k (x) is the logits of the k th model with K being the number of models taken into consideration, and w k are the ensemble weights, K k=1 w k = 1 . In Ens-Logits method, K models only give one prediction.
Ensemble in prediction (Ens-Pred) [12] averages the softmax outputs of multiple models:
Ensemble in loss (Ens-loss) postpones the ensemble stage after the cross entropy loss:
In these three methods, the only difference is where to combine the outputs of multiple models, but they reveal different attack abilities. 
Experiments
To compare the effectiveness of these three ensemble methods, we conduct experiments on 1000 ImageNet-compatible images 1 . We attack an ensemble of eight models, which are four traditionally trained models-Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [25] , Inception v4 (Inc-v4) [26] , Inception Resnet v2 (IncRes-v2) [26] , Resnet v2-101 (Res-v2-101) [6] , and four adversarially trained models-Inc-v3 adv [10] , Inc-v3 adv-ens3 , Inc-v3 adv-ens4 , IncRes-v2 adv-ens [27] . Adversarially trained models are robust against one step attack algorithms like FGSM. Beyond these eight models for white-box attacks, we also use VGG-16 [22] and DenseNet [7] to test the performance of black-box attacks.
In experiments, we test the performance of these three ensemble methods based on FGSM attack and I-FGSM attack with 3 iterations. The maximum perturbation is set to 16 with pixel value ranges from 0 to 255. The ensemble weights w k are set to 1 /K equally. Error rates of all models are shown in Table 1 . Note that a higher error rate indicates a higher success rate of the attack.
We find that Ens-Logits outperforms Ens-Loss in white-box attacks significantly and it has much higher transfer rates than Ens-Pred. In most cases, Ens-Logits achieves higher or similar error rates for these models. This suggests that ensemble in logits takes the good from both sides, i.e., it simultaneously obtains higher success rates of white-box and black-box attacks than other competitors.
Discussion
In this section, we show some geometric properties of ensemble methods to show why ensemble in logits (Ens-Logits) performs better than ensemble in prediction (Ens-Pred) and ensemble in loss (Ens-Loss).
The gradients of these three ensemble methods can be derived as:
Ens-Pred:
Ens-Loss:
Ens-Logits
Ens-Pred
Ens-Loss ! " ! # $ Figure 1 : Demonstration of the gradient directions of three ensemble methods-Ens-Logits, Ens-Pred and Ens-Loss. M 1 and M 2 are two models and x is a datapoint. x is closer to M 1 than M 2 . The adversarial gradient directions to maximize the loss function of M 1 and M 2 are orthogonal to their corresponding decision boundaries. By Eq. (7)-(9), the gradient directions of these three ensemble methods to attack both M 1 and M 2 are shown as red, bule and green lines. We can see that Ens-Pred and Ens-Loss prefer the gradient direction of M 1 , to which the datapoint is closer. In this case, only Ens-Logits can fool both models.
It can be seen that in Ens-Logits, the gradient of the loss function J (x, y) w.r.t input x is the product of the ensemble prediction error y − p(x) and the averaged partial derivatives ∂l k (x) ∂x , while in Ens-Pred and Ens-Loss, the errors of the prediction are calculated separately inside the summation, which give an imbalanced treatment for each model. In particular, Fig. 1 gives a demonstration. The gradient directions of Ens-Loss and Ens-Pred prefer the direction orthogonal to the decision boundary of the model, which is easier to attack (i.e., the datapoint is closer to the decision boundary). The reason is that if the datapoint lies near the decision boundary of model k, the prediction error y − p k (x) is larger, thus model k contributes more to the overall gradient. However, Ens-Logits can eliminate this effect and is not sensitive to the difference of the predictions given by different models. When attacking an ensemble of models, the equal treatment for each model may bring strong attack ability. Thus Ens-Logits outperforms Ens-Pred and Ens-Loss in practice.
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method

Algorithm
In this section, we detail the proposed momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM), which is a straightforward extension of I-FGSM, by introducing momentum. We view the problem of discovering adversarial examples as a simple optimization problem as:
arg max
The view from optimization gives us an opportunity to apply useful techniques in optimization literature to this problem. The momentum method [19] is a technique for accelerating gradient descent that accumulates a velocity vector in the gradient direction of the loss function across iterations. The memorization of previous gradients can help to escape local minima and maxima. Momentum method also shows its effectiveness in stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to stable the updates. In this paper, we apply the idea of momentum to discovering adversarial examples and obtain tremendous benefits.
Our attack algorithm MI-FGSM can be summarized as follows:
with g 0 = 0 and x * 0 = x. g t gathers the gradients of the first t iterations with a momentum factor µ. If µ equals to 0, MI-FGSM degenerates to I-FGSM. In each iteration, the current gradient ∇ x J(x * t , y) is normalized by the L 1 distance of itself, because we notice that the scale of the gradients in different iterations varies in magnitude.
Experiments
To prove the effectiveness of MI-FGSM on both white-box and black-box attacks, we conduct experiments on the same 1000 ImageNet-compatible images. Similar to previous settings, we use Ens-Logits method to attack the ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-101, Inc-v3 adv , Inc-v3 adv-ens3 , Inc-v3 adv-ens4 and IncRes-v2 adv-ens . We measure the performance of black-box attacks based on VGG-16 and DenseNet. Other hyperparameters are set as = 16, α = /T , w k = 1 /K and µ = 1 with T being the number of iterations and K being the number of models (i.e., 8).
We show the error rates of all models against FGSM, I-FGSM and MI-FGSM attacks in Table 2 .
The error rates of a model means the success rates of the attacks. The number of iterations T = 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 for I-FGSM and MI-FGSM to fully compare the performance.
For white-box attacks, MI-FGSM obtains much higher success rates than one step FGSM and performs sightly better than I-FGSM. So it is true that MI-FGSM maintains as a strong white-box adversary like other iterative methods. On the other hand, for black-box attacks, MI-FGSM increases the success rates when increasing the iterations, which is opposite from the observation of I-FGSM. Surprisingly, MI-FGSM outperforms FGSM quite a lot in black-box attacks. For example, the success rates of MI-FGSM at 20 iterations are 16.3% and 26.7% higher than FGSM when attacking VGG-16 and DenseNet. On the contrary, I-FGSM does not have this great transferability. The success rates of I-FGSM against black-box models are much lower than FGSM, as well as MI-FGSM. It can be concluded that MI-FGSM is a much stronger attack algorithm than one step methods like FGSM and other iterative methods like I-FGSM for both white-box and black-box attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) to generate adversarial examples. MI-FGSM incorporates a momentum term in iterative fast gradient sign method (I-FGSM) to stable updates and escape local maxima. Experiments show that MI-FGSM is a much stronger attack algorithm than FGSM and I-FGSM in both white-box and black-box attacks. We hope that it can serve as a new benchmark attack algorithm for evaluating the robustness of machine learning models. We also show that ensemble in logits is a better choice to attack an ensemble of models, which may provide some insights for future research.
